Kennedy Muise
Professor Shirk
POL 357 B
5 May, 2017
What is
Terrorism? (Revised)
Throughout this course, many different cases of
terrorism have been studied and analyzed, from 18th century piracy,
to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), to Al Qaeda, and many others. After
revisiting my first essay on the topic, I recognized that my initial definition
of terrorism does not deviate too much to what I think it is now, after having taken
this course. My original definition of terrorism was: “a set of tactics
used to inflict violence and fear onto noncombatants to obtain specific
political goals, such as regime, territorial, and policy change, social
control, and maintenance of the status quo.” While I still agree with this
definition, I think it could be expanded further to include state and non-state
actors. Terrorist actors and groups such as HAMAS and the French government during
the Algerian War of Independence, have caused me to expand my original
definition. Therefore, an even more concise definition of terrorism is a set of
tactics used to inflict violence and fear onto noncombatants by state and non-state actors to obtain
specific political goals, such as regime, territorial, and policy change,
social control, and maintenance of the status quo.
Before
analyzing HAMAS and the French government according to the new definition of
terrorism, I would like to review some of the main concepts I presented in my
first essay. First, I explained that according to Michael Lewis, a combatant is
part of the “‘armed forces of a Party to a conflict’”, a noncombatant is not a
member of the military and keeps his/her civilian immunity by not participating
in armed and violent acts, and a terrorist is a civilian who gives up his/her
civilian immunity to inflict violence onto others (Lewis 227). Next, I
explained that according to Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, terrorists have
five main tactics and five main political goals. These tactics include attrition,
intimidation, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding. However, for the analysis
of HAMAS and the French government, I will only focus on the intimidation
strategy, which is executed when failed or weak states are easily threatened
and exploited, and the spoiling strategy, which is used to break apart peace
agreements by developing mistrusting relations between the moderate leaders of
terrorist groups and the government itself (Kydd and Walter 66-67, 74). In
addition, the five political goals of a terrorist include regime, territorial,
and policy change, social control, and maintenance on the status quo. To
concentrate on HAMAS and the French government, I will only be looking at territorial
change, which shows how a group wants to expand a state’s territory in hopes of
creating a new state; social control, which includes threats; and the maintenance
of the status quo, which involves constraining the rights of a certain
population (Kydd and Walter 52).
Through this
quick review, most of the major parts of the new definition of terrorism have
been defined again—the definition of a noncombatant and the explanation of a
“set of tactics” and “specific political goals.” The last major component of
the new definition involves the explanation of state and non-state actors which
will be cleared up by analyzing two cases from this course: HAMAS and the
French government during the Algerian War. These two cases will show that
terrorism involves both state and non-state actors, and will demonstrate how
the new definition of terrorism categorizes these two groups are terrorist
organizations.
First, HAMAS
is an example of a terrorist organization that is a non-state actor because it inflicts
fear onto noncombatants, uses the spoiling and intimidation strategy, and has
the goal of territorial change. According to the HAMAS Charter, HAMAS is known
as “a distinct Palestinian Movement which… strives to raise the banner of Allah
over every inch of Palestine.” HAMAS is a non-state actor whose goals are
heavily driven by Islamic beliefs. While HAMAS is an Islamic
group, its main goal is to acquire Palestine because HAMAS members believe this
land was taken from them by the Jews. By applying Kydd and Walter’s
categorization of terrorists’ political goals, HAMAS’ goal can be categorized
as territorial change. As mentioned, territorial change involves gaining
territory. According to the HAMAS Charter, HAMAS “believes that the land of
Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and…no one can
renounce it…or abandon it.” While Palestine is shared between the Jews, Arabs,
and Muslims, HAMAS believes that Palestine rightly belongs to them, according
to the teachings of the Koran and the prophet Muhammad.
To achieve this goal of territorial change, HAMAS uses tactics
that inflict violence on noncombatants, namely the spoiling and intimidation
strategies. HAMAS employs the spoiling strategy by refusing to form peace
agreements over Palestine land, simply because the members believe that peace
resolutions “are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement”
and that those resolutions are not “capable of responding to demands, or of
restoring rights or doing justice to the oppressed [Muslims]” (HAMAS Charter).
By rejecting all potential and current peace agreements made between Israel and
other Muslim organizations, such as the PLO, HAMAS breaks apart any hopes for
peace in the region; in addition, HAMAS causes a mistrusting relationship
between Israel, the PLO, which is trying to establish effective peace
agreements, and themselves. As an Islamic organization, HAMAS wants to “usurp” Palestine
from the Jews through jihad which is “a duty [that binds] all Muslims” (HAMAS
Charter). Due to the instability in the Israel-Palestine region, HAMAS had used
the intimidation strategy to threaten and exploit the population living there. HAMAS
has targeted, killed, and terrorized thousands of Israeli and Palestinian
noncombatants, especially in Gaza, through kidnappings, stabbings, torture,
beatings, shooting, and suicide bombings (Van Esveld). Therefore, due to these specific
tactics, goals, and violence against civilians, HAMAS is a valuable example of
a non-state terrorist organization.
The French government during the Algerian War is an example of a
state terrorist group because it used the spoiling and intimidation strategy,
and because it attempted to obtain the maintenance of the status quo. First,
the French government was a colonial power that conquered Algeria, and ruled
over the country for about 130 years, which shows that the French government is
a state power (Thomas 218). Before the war of independence, the French
government reacted to the revolt of Muslim Algerians during the Setif Massacre
with “retributive violence of army, police, and settler vigilantes…to restore orderliness
to colonial society” (Thomas 221). The Setif Massacre shows that the French
government wanted to “maintain the status quo” by constraining the rights of
the revolting individuals who wanted to secede from the French government’s
colonial grasp. The massacre also demonstrates how the French government used violence
against non-combatants through the spoiling and the intimidation strategies. While
the French government fought against the FLN in later battles, it also targeted
Algerian civilians and the Pied Noirs, in attempt to strike fear into the population
and to again, maintain the status quo. During the Setif Massacre, the French
government was partly responsible for over 20,000 deaths through assassinations,
bombings, and killings (“French troops massacre thousands…”). In
other battles, such as the Battle of Algiers, the French government was
responsible for bombing and killing around 70 noncombatants, or those not
involved with the FLN (Evans). The Setif Massacre and other battles “marked a
turning point in the relations between France…and the Muslim population” and
had a traumatic “impact on the Algerian Muslim population” (“French troops
massacre thousands…”). These details
show how the French government employed the spoiling strategy, where it broke
the trust of both FLN and the Algerian people because of its violent
retaliation; they also show how the government employed the intimidation strategy
by using fear and violence through bombings and mass killings throughout the
war. Both of these tactics lead to the death of civilians. Therefore, the French
government is a significant example of a state terrorist actor during the Algerian
Civil War due to its tactics, goals, and violence against noncombatants.
Most definitions
of terrorism, such as that of the US State department definition, only involve non-state
agents. However, the French government should be included in the definition of
terrorism as a state actor. There is no reason why a state cannot be a
terrorist; a state can employ any of the five tactics and political goals that
Kydd and Walter explain in their academic work. A state can also incite fear
onto a civilian population, and may even be more effective at it than a
non-state actor. Therefore, a state can be a terrorist actor and the French
government during the Algerian War is a telling example.
The cases of
HAMAS and the French government during the Algerian War of Independence show that
my previous definition of terrorism needed to be expanded to include both state
and non-state actors. Therefore, a more complete definition of terrorism
describes: a non-state and/or state actor; their use of fear and violence against
noncombatants; their specific tactics, such as attrition, intimidation,
provocation, spoiling, or outbidding; and their political goals, such as regime,
territorial, and policy change, social control, and maintenance of the status
quo. As the cases of HAMAS and the French government demonstrated, each case of
terrorism involves different contexts and circumstances, making terrorism a
rather confusing and controversial topic. Nonetheless, defining terrorism concisely
may allow global leaders and organizations to easily recognize and evaluate
terrorist attacks and organizations, in order to implement more effective
counter-terrorism strategies to ultimately maintain a more peaceful world.
Works
Cited
Evans, Martin. “The Battle of Algiers: Historical
Truth and Filmic Representation.” Open
Democracy. 18 December 2012. Web. Accessed 5 May 5, 2017.
“French Troops Massacre Thousands in Algeria
After Demonstration at Setif Leads to Violence.” Palestine: Information with
Provenance. Web. Accessed 3
May 2017.
Kydd,
Andrew H, and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism.” International Security. MIT Press, Vol.
31, No. 1. 49-80. Print. Accessed 3 May 2017.
Lewis, Michael W.
“Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting.” Taking Sides: Clashing Views in World Politics. Ed. John T. Rourke.
McGraw-Hill, 2014. 226-231. Print. Accessed 3 May 2017.
“The Charter of the HAMAS.” Ariel
Center for Policy Research. Web. Accessed 3 May 2017.
Thomas, Martin. “Violence in the Algerian War of Independence.” The Routledge History of Terrorism, ed.
Randall D. Law, Routledge, 2015, 218-234.
Van
Esveld, Bill, and Fred Abrahams, and Darryl Li. “Under Cover of War: HAMAS
Political Violence in GAZA.” Human Rights
Watch. 20 April 2009. Web. Accessed 3 May 2017.